I. INTRODUCTION
The ability t o build a secure channel is one of the most challenging elds of research in modern communication. Since the secure channel has many applications, in particular for mobile phone, satellite and internet-based communications, there is a need for fast, e ective and secure transmission protocols 1]. Here we present a novel principle of a cryptosystem based on a new phenomenon which we observe for arti cial neural networks.
The goal of cryptography is to enable two partners to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way that an attacker cannot understand and decrypt the transmitted message. In a general scenario, the message is encrypted by the sender through a key E k , and the result, the ciphertext, is sent o ver the channel. A third party, e a vesdropping on the channel, should not be able to determine what the message was. However, the recipient who knows the encryption key can decrypt the ciphertext using his private key D k .
In a private{key system the recipient has to agree with the sender on a secret key E k , which requires a hidden communication prior to the transmission of any message. In a public{key system, on the other side, the key E k is published and a hidden communication is not necessary. Nevertheless, an attacker cannot decrypt the transmitted message since it is computationally infeasible to invert the encryption function without knowing the key D k . In a key-exchange protocol, both partners start with private keys and transmit { using a public protocol { their encrypted private keys which, after some transformations, leads to a common secret key. In most applications a public-key system is used which is based on numbertheory where the keys are long integers 1, 2] .
In this report we suggest a novel cryptosystem. It is a key-exchange protocol which uses neither number theory nor a public key, but is based on a learning process of neural networks: The two participants start from a secret set of vectors E k (0) and D k (0) without knowing the key of their partner. By exchanging public information the two k eys develop into a common time dependent k ey E k (t) = ;D k (t), which is used to encrypt and decrypt a given message.
An attacker who knows the algorithm and observes any exchange of information nds it di cult to reveal the keys E k (t) and D k (t). Our method is based on a new phenomenon: Synchronization of neural networks by mutual learning 3].
Simple models of neural networks describe a wide variety of phenomena in neurobiology and information theory 4{6]. Arti cial neural networks are systems of elements interacting by adaptive couplings which are trained from a set of examples. After training they function as content addressable associative memory, a s c l a s s i e r s or as prediction algorithms.
Two feedforward networks can synchronize their synaptic weights by exchanging and learning their mutual outputs for given common inputs. Surprisingly, synchronization is fast the numberof bits required to achieve perfect alignment of the weights is lower than the number of components of the weights. After synchronization, the synaptic weights de ne the common time dependent private key E k (t) = ;D k (t). The complexity of our cryptosystems scales linearly with the size of the network (=number of bits of the keys). With respect to possible attacks, we nd that tracking the weights of one of the networks by the attacker is a di cult problem. In summary, from this new biological mechanism one can construct e cient encryption systems using keys which change permanently. The paper is organized as follows. In section IIwe speculate on the possible biological meaning of this new bridge between the theory of neural networks and cryptography. In section III the de nition of the architecture and the dynamical rules are presented. In section IV the synchronization time between the parties derived from simulations are presented, while in section V the e ciency of a simple attacker is examined. In section VI some possible generalizations of our secure channel are brie y discussed.
II.POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE
Synchronization is the subject of recent research in neuroscience 7{11], where, for instance, in experiments on cats and monkeys it was found that the spike activity of neurons in the visual cortex has correlations which depend on the kind of optical stimulus shown to the animal 12]. The phenomenon described here suggests that synchronization can be used by biological neuronal networks or by networks of the immune system to exchange secure information between di erent parts of an organism.
The interpretation of the synchronization process as a mechanism to build a secure channel is a controversial subject. The need in biological systems for the secure transmission of secret data which is incorporated by a biological mechanism to encrypt and to decrypt a data is in question.
At t h a t p o i n t w e present our viewpoint on the possibility of such a biological realization.
In table I we demonstrate a partial list of operations commonly used by a user of a personal computer (or by human activities in daily life). In comparison we present the implications of the research of modern biology, indicating that similar operations such as 'copy', 'paste', 'insert', 'cut' etc. exist in the activity of a cell and DNA. It is clear that biological operations are restricted to biological purposes, hence they are very limited in comparison to the variety of options and ags suggested by any primitive software. A possible conclusion of the above comparison would be the following paradigm. All operations that can be found at the macroscopic level of human activity can also be found in biological activity on the microscopic level. Hence, the adaptation of this paradigm indicates that the secure transmission of data also exists on the microscopic activities of a biological system. Encryption and decryption of biological signals should also befound in the microscopic functioning of human activities. The level of security, of course, should berescaled with the expected capability o f a sophisticated biological attacker. 
III.DEFINITION: NETWORK AND DYNAMICAL RULES
In the following we i n troduce and investigate a simple model which s h o ws the properties sketched above. The architecture used by the recipient and the sender is a two-layered perceptron, exempli ed here by a parity machine (PM) with K hidden units. More precisely, the size of the input is K Nand its components are denoted by x kj k = 1 2 ::: K and j = 1 ::: N . For simplicity, each input unit takes binary values, x kj = 1. The K binary hidden units are denoted by y 1 y 2 ::: y K . Our architecture is characterized by non-overlapping receptive elds (a tree), where the weight from the jth input unit to the kth hidden unit is denoted by w kj , and the output bit O is the product of the state of the hidden units (see Fig. 1 ). For simplicity we discuss PMs with three hidden units K = 3.
We use integer weights boundedby L, i.e., w kj can take the values ;L ; L + 1 ::: L. The secret information of each o f t h e t wo partners is the initial values for the weights, w S kj and w R kj , for the sender and the recipient, respectively. It consists of 6N integer numbers, 3N of the recipient and 3N of the sender. Sender and recipient do not know the initial numbersof their partners, which are used to construct the common secret key.
Each n e t work is then trained with the output of its partner. At e a c h training step, for the synchronization as well as for the encryption/decryption step, a new common public input vector (x kj ) is needed for both the sender and the recipient. For a given input, the output is calculated in the following two steps. In the rst step, the state of the three hidden units, 
In the case of zero eld, Only weights belonging to the one (or three) hidden units which are in the same state as that of their output unit are updated, in each of the two networks. Note that by using this dynamical rule, the sender is trying to imitate the response of the recipient and the recipient is trying to imitate that of the sender 16].
There are three main ingredients in our model which are essential for a secure key exchange protocol: Firstly, from the knowledge of the output, the internal representation of the hidden units is not uniquely determined because there is a four fold degeneracy (for the output +1 there are four internal representations for the three hidden units (1 1 1) (1 ;1 ;1) (;1 1 ;1) (;1 ;1 1)). As a consequence, an observer cannot know which of the weight vectors is updated according to equation (2) . Secondly, we have chosen the parity machine since there is a lack of correlation between the state of the hidden unit and the output bit (for output bit 1, for instance, for each hidden unit there are two internal representations with state 1 and two internal representations with state ;1). This observation favors the PM over other multilayer networks. Thirdly, since each component is bounded by L, an observer cannot simply invert the sum of equation (2) 
IV. SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS
We nd that the two PMs learning from each other are able to synchronize, at least for some parameters K L and N 16]. Our simulations show that after an initial relatively short transient time the two partners align themselves into antiparallel states. It is easy to verify from our learning rule that as soon as the two networks are synchronized they remain so forever. The number of time steps required to reach this state depends on the initial weight vectors and on the sequence of random inputs, hence it is distributed. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of synchronization time obtained from at least 1000 samples. It is evident that two communicating networks synchronize in a rather short time. The average synchronization time t av decreases with increasing size N of the system (see Fig. 3 ) it seems to converge to t av ' 410 for large networks. This observation was recently con rmed by an analytical solution of the presented model 17]. Surprisingly, in the limit of large N one needs to exchange only about 400 bits to obtain agreement between 3N components. However, one should keep in mind that the two partners do not learn the initial weights of each other, they are just attracted to a dynamical state with opposite weight v ectors.
Note that this fast synchronization, independent of the size of the network, may also serve as an e cient biological mechanism to initialize two networks with the same initial conditions -the strength of the synapses. The number of operations (updates) per bit is very small, 200 for L = 3 a n d o n l y 10 for L = 1 where synchronization is achieved after a few dozen steps. In arti cial computers one can achieve a similar goal by the synchronization of the initial seed of a random numbergenerator between the two partners. The complexity perbit (among 3N) is governed by the complexity to generate a random number. As soon as the weights of the sender and the recipient are antiparallel the public initialization of our private-key cryptosystem is terminated successfully and the encryption of the message starts. There are then two possibilities in choosing an algorithm: First, use a conventional encryption algorithm, for example a stream cipher like the well-known BlumBlum-Shub bit generator 1]. In this case the seed for this pseudo-random number generator is constructed from our weight vector after synchronization. Note that this bit generator is secure: even without a secret message one cannot guess the next bit from a polynomial numberof consecutive output bits. Second, use the PM with time{dependent weights itself for a stream cipher by multiplying its output bit with the corresponding bit of the secret data.
In the case of the PM, the complexity of the encryption/decryption processes scales linearly with the size of the transmitted message, whereas the complexity of the synchronization process does not scale with the size of the network. Hence our construction is a linear cryptosystem 18].
V. AN ATTACKER
We now examine a possible attack on our cryptosystem. An attacker eavesdropping on the line knows the algorithm as well as the actual mutual outputs, hence he knows in which time steps the weights are changed. In addition, the attacker knows the input x kj as well. However, the attacker does not know the initial conditions of the weights of the sender and the recipient. As a consequence, even for the synchronized state, the internal representations of the hidden units of the sender and the recipient are hidden from the attacker and he does not know which are the weights participating in the learning step. For random inputs all four internal representations appear with equal probability in any stage of the dynamical process, hence for t training steps there are 4 t possibilities to select internal representations 14].
Therefore, on the time scale of synchronization, the observing network has di culty in obtaining complete knowledge about the other two networks. We have simulated the following basic attack on our cryptosystem. The architecture of an attacker is identical to the architecture of the partners, the recipient and the sender. The dynamics of this attacker tries to imitate the moves of one of the parties, the sender for instance. The observing network is trained with the input vector and output bit of the sender, and the training step is performed only if sender and recipient disagree with each other 3].
The learning rule may be considered for each component of the weight v ectors as a kind of biased random walk with re ecting boundaries. Therefore, for very long times, the observer may take the weight vector of the other network by chance. The distribution of the ratio between the time t sync the sender and recipient need to synchronize and the learning time Hence the time to synchronize by chance is very l o n g a n d i n t h e example discussed here it is of order O( 10 5 ) 19]. The heart of our cryptosystem is that synchronization is a much simpler task than tracking by an observer.
Recently the dynamic of such simple attackers was formulated and examined analytically for large networks, N 1. The analytical results for the learning time were found to be in agreement with the results of simulations 17].
Possible advanced attacks were recently examined in 20], where it seems that the presented cryptosystem is breakable under an attack based on an ensemble of attackers using more advanced strategies -dynamical rules. The question of whether a practical secure channel based on a public protocol for the synchronization of the parties exists is in question. We would like to conclude this section and to repeat our abovementioned statement that the required level of security for biological networks should be rescaled with the expected capability of a sophisticated biological attacker.
VI. GENERALIZATION
Our key exchange protocol can be generalized in the following directions as is brie y described below.
Bit-Packages: An important issue for the implementation of our cryptosystem is to accelerate the synchronization process from hundreds of time steps to a few dozen while maintaining the security of our channel. Surprisingly, both of these two goals can beachieved simultaneously by sending bit packages (BP). In this scenario the process contains the following steps: Several partners: Up to now we have discussed the scenario of two partners exchanging secret information. But our method can be extended to the case of a pool of several participants sharing secret information. In this case we w ould like to transmit information among several partners, but only if all of them are available to act cooperatively. The mutual information is the global ow of information, namely the output bits of all participants. Assume that we would like to build a common private key among an even number Q of partners, each of them represented by a PM. In each time step each of the Q partners is exposed to the Q outputs O Generation of inputs: A common public input can begenerated following a public seed numberfor a random number generator. The main disadvantage of this method is that the numberof new random variables necessary to de ne a common input is of order O(N ). A simple way to overcome this di culty is to shift all of the 3N input units one place to the right a n d to set the left-most input equal, for instance, to the output of the sender 21,22].
Permutation of the weights: In order to increase the security of our channel, one can apply the following types of permutations: (a) To permute a fraction (or all) of the weights belonging to an updated hidden units. 18] As for the hardware implementation of our cryptosystem, the calculation of the local elds, eq. (1), are similar to a linear lter which can beimplemented in parallel using existing technologies. Hence, the complexities of calculating local elds of the hidden units are taken as order O(1) 
